‘So began a policy of holding on to hearts and minds.’
Conflict of interest: Richard Seebohm on a Malaysian example
‘A “no hate” policy was a significant factor.’
It took an article by the controversial ex-diplomat Craig Murray to make me realise that we are being tempted to relish the slaughter of Soviet soldiers by the Ukrainians – using our weapons. We think of Vietnam. We think of Iraq, or of Afghanistan, or Syria, Yemen or conflict in Africa.
But armed aggression doesn’t always have to be met with an entirely military response. One striking case is the rescue of Malaysia from Chinese communist assailants between 1948 and its full democratic independence in 1960. One version of the story has been told by Noel Barber in his 1971 book The War of the Running Dogs. I don’t expect many Friends have seen it.
Malaysia was then a British protectorate or colony, consisting mainly of provinces nominally ruled by local sultans. In 1948 the communists began a campaign of assassinations and executions. The idea was to convince locals that the only road to safety was by siding with them. They had networks of camps in the jungle, drawing on weapons and techniques obtained when, before Hiroshima, they were fighting the Japanese alongside the British army.
The successive (and highly resourceful) British administrators in Malaysia, backed by the then Labour government, saw that a military onslaught, using the troops already stationed there, would simply drive the locals into the communist camp. So began a policy of holding on to hearts and minds. The police and not the army were (literally) to call the shots. The rubber planters and miners were nonetheless armed, and helped to armour their vehicles. The Chinese ‘squatters’ in surrounding towns and communities were resettled on vacant land, and given title to the plots they were given. The whole population was registered and given identity cards. These policies were supported not only with leaflets but with loudspeaker messages from aircraft.
Counter-culturally, the authorities were funded and encouraged to offer opponents significant sums of money to change sides – in fact massive bribery. It was intelligence staff and not soldiers who were able to recruit informants and pinpoint target turncoats. Where locals felt safe they could not be coerced into feeding the communists; consequentially, their failing morale and physical condition was a significant factor. So was a ‘no hate’ policy in propaganda and interrogation. Great effort was put into the idea that everyone, whatever their race, religion or province, was Malaysian. Quite a lot of armed ‘defence’ was exerted as well, so that the communists could never claim control of a provincial area. The book shows that this was not plain sailing. Of the 12,000 or so communist activists and sympathisers, 6,698 lost their lives, as did 1,865 British and local combatants, together with 2,470 civilians. But basically the policies worked. Malaysia is now a democratic state.
Faced with a narcissistic fantasist, Ukraine could be less easy to liberate in this way. But a ‘no hate’ treatment of captured or encountered opponents would help.
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